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GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE: PROMISE OR PLACEBO?
In 1967 the Florida Legislature enacted the "Government in the Sunshine
Law,"' which attempts to open the deliberations of state and local governments to the public. Since its passage, the Sunshine Law has been the subject
of continued debate. This note attempts to place this debate in perspective
by examining the scope and effect of the Act, analyzing cases and statutes
of Florida and other states having similar laws, and evaluating the statute's
present and potential impact.
THE DEMAND FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT

The supporters of senate bill 9 (later the Sunshine Law) felt that certain
state and local practices, manifested in dosed meetings and behind-thescenes manipulation, indicated an urgent need for abolition of secretive
government practices.2 However, without media influence and pressure, "Govemnment in the Sunshine" might never have survived committee action. In
1967 reapportionment of the legislature had increased the proportional representation of the urban centers in central and south Florida. Generally, the urban representatives were more sensitive to the influence of the media than the
rural legislators who dominated the legislature before reapportionment. The
media's active endorsement of the measure helped convince the legislators
of the popularity of an open meeting regulation and provided significant
impetus for passage of the Sunshine Law.3
Legislative recognition of the desire for open government was not unique
to Florida. Five other states enacted open-meeting laws while Florida's bill
was being debated. 4 The increased demands for open government in the
United States since World War II seem to have had no specific origin, but
an aversion to undue centralization and irresponsible government revealed
itself in such political issues as reapportionment and home rule. The
emergence of an affluent and better educated society whose attention focused
on sophisticated issues strengthened the demands for political responsibility.
The increased impact of mass media on society played an important role in
directing public attention to inadequacies and abuses of government. Whatever its source, the public's urge to participate more fully in legislative
decisions was evident.
In Florida, while not all governmental units were felt to be deceptive or
corrupt, dosed sessions provided a shield for occasional instances of irresponI.

FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969).
Interview with J. Emory Cross, State Senator from Gainesville, Florida, in Gainesville, Florida, April 14, 1970; interview with John S. Rawls, Judge, First District Court of
Appeal, in Tallahassee, Florida, March 26, 1970 [hereinafter cited as interviews].
3. Interviews, note 2 supra.
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-12805 (1968); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§54950-60 (West 1966); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§57-601 et seq. (1967); NJ. REv. STAT. §§10:4-1 et seq. (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §5-6-17 (1953). It should be noted that the Florida bill was debated for ten years.
It was introduced in every regular session of the legislature from 1957 until its passage
in 1967.

2.
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sibility and corruption that public disclosure might have prevented. Furthermore, testimony before the house committees revealed that the existing need
for more responsible government was not confined to the local level. One of
the state commissions advised that the law not be enacted because many of
the commission's applicants for employment were convicted felons, known
drug addicts, or otherwise unqualified for state employment. The commission
disclosed that it sometimes employed these people either unknowingly or
5
inadvertently and urged that such practices should not be exposed. In reaction, proponents of the Sunshine Law demanded the inclusion of personnel
matters in the Act and emphasized that this testimony indicated an immediate
need for the bill.6
Legislative History of Government in the Sunshine
After its passage in the senate, 7 the "Government in the Sunshine Law"
was submitted to the house, where several amendments were proposed. 8 Although some of these amendments might have resolved subsequent problems
concerning the law's applicability, the senate refused to concur in any
restriction of its original proposal. 9 As a result, only one amendment was
adopted at the Act's passage, and that amendment gave the law additional
impact. It provided standing to any citizen of the state, jurisdiction in the
circuit courts, and injunctive relief to enable citizens to protect their new
right."" The Sunshine Law, as finally enacted, states: 1(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency
or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation or any political subdivision, except at otherwise provided
in the constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared
to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution,
rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered binding except
as taken or made at such meeting.
(2) The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission
of any such state agency or authority shall be promptly recorded and
such records shall be open to public inspection. The circuit courts of
5. Interview with J. Emory Cross, note 2 supra.
6. Id.
7. FLA. S. JouR. 679 (June 1967).

8. FLA. H.R. JouR. 958-59 (June 1967).
9. The House considered repeal of the existing public meeting law applicable to city

and town councils, exemption of purely administrative acts of affected agencies, and specific
inclusion of the Florida Education Association within the scope of the Act. The representatives rejected these proposals, but submitted the following for senate approval: an
amendment giving circuit courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the statute,
an amendment granting an exemption from application of the law to hearings involving
individuals charged with violation of law or regulations respecting employment, and an
amendment prohibiting application of the enforcement provisions of the Act to personnel
matters. FiA. S. JouR. 679 (June 1967); FLA. H.R. Joutr. 958-59 (June 1967).
10. FLA. S. Jour. 679 (June 1967).
11. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969).
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this state shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the
purposes of this section upon application by any citizens of this state.
(3) Any person who is a member of a board or commission or of
any state agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or
any political subdivision who violates the provisions of this section by
attending a meeting not held in accordance with the provisions thereof
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), or
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Precedent for the Sunshine Law
Florida's statute is not without precedent. Other states, especially west18
ern ones, have supported open meetings in constitutions,1 2 statutes, and
6
5
case law.14 In 1953 New Mexico- and California were the first states
to pass comprehensive open meeting laws, which are similar to the Florida act.
New Mexico's law requires that all final decisions of all governing bodies of
state or local subdivisions supported by public funds be made at public
meetings. 7 California's comprehensive Brown Act is limited in its application
to local government levels, but it applies even to library boards and recreation
commissions."' Moreover, Florida Statutes, section 165.22, is precedent for the
Sunshine Law. Enacted in 1905, that section requires that all city and town
meetings be open to the public. On its face, the Sunshine Law seems to
9
reiterate the provisions of this earlier statute, which declares:'
All meetings of any city or town council or board of aldermen of any
city or town in the state, shall be held open to the public of any such
city or town, and all records and books of any such city or town shall
be at all times open to the inspection of any of the citizens thereof.
In addition to a fine or imprisonment enforcement provision, the earlier law
demands vacation of office by any violator of the act.20
12. The Texas Constitution states that all trials must be open to the public. In 1935
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the relevant section applied to the county
commissioner's court: "They [the commissioners] meet as a court and transact the county
business in open session. Such requirement . . . is substantial, both that the members may
have the benefit of the knowledge and opinions of the other members, as well as that
the public may know when and where its affairs are being transacted." Tarrant County v.
Smith, 81 S.W. 2d 537, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
13. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§54950-60 (West 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN §5-6-17 (1953); UTAH
R a.

STAT. §202

(1898).

14. Tarrant County v. Smith, 81 S.W. 2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Acord v. Booth,
33 Utah 279, 93 P.734 (1908).
15. N.M.STAT. ANN §5-6-17 (1953).
16. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§54950-60 (West 1966).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §5-6-17 (1953).
18. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§54952.5, 54953 (West 1966).
19. FLA. STAT. §165.22 (1969).
20.

Id.
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However, in Turk v. Richard2l the Supreme Court of Florida considerably
limited the effect of section 165.22 by enunciating the so-called "formal
meeting" doctrine. The early law was held applicable only to "formal
assemblages of the council sitting as a joint deliberative body as... required
or authorized by law . .. [and] held for the transaction of official municipal
business ...
."22 Thus the statute, which opened meetings of city or town
councils or boards of aldermen to the public, was coupled with a judicial
interpretation requiring potential voting as a necessary prerequisite for the
enforcement of open meetings. As a result, city and town government meetings were required to be open only when votes "could be taken, though
[they were] not necessarily certain to be taken." 23 The narrow literal scope
of the statute and its further limitation by the judiciary left much governmental activity immune from public scrutiny. For this reason, the 1905 law
was largely ineffective.
PRESENT CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE

Superficially, the Government in the Sunshine Law seems similar to its
town council predecessor. However, relying on legislative intent, the Florida
24
courts have given the Sunshine Law wider application than the former act.
Because the Sunshine Law appears overly broad and ambiguous in certain
25
areas, it was challenged on the ground that it was "void for vagueness."
Opponents of the statute asserted it violated the constitutional doctrine
that a "statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process
of law." 26 Rejecting this contention, the Florida supreme court held that the
law properly expressed its legislative intent and provided a substantially dear
27
mandate.
Although the Sunshine Law is constitutionally valid, the breadth of its
language has raised problems of construction. The terms of the law are not
tempered by any practical exceptions, nor do they provide precise guidelines
for operational compliance. Judicial interpretation has corrected some of
the drafting flaws, but three basic, interrelated legal issues remain. The
Sunshine Law does not state which bodies are not affected by the law; it does
not exclude any types of deliberation from its scope; and it fails to recognize
any stage in the deliberative process that might not be subject to the requirements of the Act. While courts have not explicitly delineated the issues in
21. 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
22. Id. at 544.
23. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
24. See Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971), aff'g 251 So. 2d 847 (3d D.CA.
Fla. 1970), aff'g 52 Fla. Supp. 7 (11th Cir. 1969); Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran,
224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 231 So. 2d 34 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1970); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969).
25. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
26. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
27. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
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this manner, the Second District Court of Appeal indicated in Times Publishing Co. v. Williams,28 that comprehension of the full meaning of the law
requires such analytical divisions.
No Florida court has faced the question of which agencies might fall
outside the application of the law. The only litigation to date deals with
those agencies to which inherent applicability is assumed, such as city
councils and boards of education.29 The language of the Act applies to all
facets of government;-0 however, the question of applicability is unresolved
with regard to groups such as ad hoc committees, which act in a purely
advisory capacity.
It is conceivable that unlimited application of the law could produce
undesirable results. The goals of certain investigatory groups, such as those
fighting organized crime, might be jeopardized by premature exposure of
important procedures and information. Where an ad hoc committee is purely
advisory and exercises no real powers, where it reaches no final determination,
and where its findings will result in later action by an authority subject to
the Sunshine Laws or the courts, the application of the law could create
ineffectiveness or inefficiency to the disadvantage of the state. One solution
to the dilemma would be to require only that such a committee state publicly
the purpose of the group and announce its membership. In such instances,
especially in investigatory actions, the committee should be entitled to conduct private sessions. This would accomplish minimum compliance with the
basic purpose and policy of the Sunshine Law while providing for confidential meetings when necessary.
If this exception were made, a problem would arise concerning which
ad hoc or advisory bodies should be excluded from application of the law.
A broad exclusion would permit many to hide behind this shield and undermine the effectiveness of the law. Unless a showing of good cause is made to
warrant exclusion, all such groups will remain within the scope of the Sunshine Law.81 A group in need of confidential hearings could insure its privacy
by requesting a court order upon proof of the advisability of dosed sessions.
Such a procedure would place the burden upon the committee or group involved to show that the open meeting policy of the state was not being
2
unnecessarily evaded.
The type and stage of deliberation to which the law is applicable has in
several cases been delineated by the courts. Rejecting the "formal meeting"
doctrine of Turk v. Richard,38 the court in Times Publishing Co. held that
the law applies to the "entire decision making process."8 4 The Florida supreme

28. 222 So. 2d 470 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969).
29. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Canney v. Board of Pub.
Instr., 231 So. 2d 34 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d
470 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969); Berns v. Miami Beach, 32 Fla. Supp. 7 (11th Cir. 1969).
30. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
31. See Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
32. See id.
33. 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
34. 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969),
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court upheld this interpretation in Miami Beach v. Berns35 and further
emphasized the applicability of the Sunshine Law, even to informal assemblies,
by stating that section 286.011 in effect repeals section 165.22.36 The fact that
no voting will take place at a particular meeting is no longer a bar to the
necessity of open sessions. 37 Any stage in a proceeding - from proposals and
reports to discussions and recommendations - is a proper subject of public
scrutiny.
The ruling in Berns was portended by Board of Public Instruction v.
Doran in which a school board, relying upon the Turk formal meeting
doctrine, continued to hold executive sessions from which reporters were
barred. The school board had asserted that only formal action was subject
to the mandate of the Sunshine Law and argued that the legislature, cognizant
of existing case law, had only intended the new law to extend the scope of
Florida Statutes, section 165.22, beyond the city and town council level. The
court provided a clue to the missing definition of "meetings" by declaring
that the law "was to cover any gathering of the members where the members
deal with some matter on which forseeable action will be taken by the
board."39
The most explicit clarification in this regard, however, is found in Berns
v. Miami Beach, in which the trial judge states: 40

The Florida legislature has mandated that ....

Deliberations, sessions,

conferences, briefings, expressions, discussions, proposals, recommenda-

35. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971). Citing Times Publishing Co. and Berns the Attorney
General of Florida has stated the opinion that the use of a secret ballot to elect a school
board chairman violated the Sunshine Law. Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. (Jan. 27, 1971).
36. Id. at 40.
37. The court clearly rejected any requirement of a quorum by stating: "[W]e have
held that the open door policy announced by the statute applies to informal as well as
formal meetings of a board at which there is a collective decision or collective commitment
of a majority of the members to take action in a particular manner on a matter affecting
the public. Any action so taken is an official act within the contemplation of the statute
and rule which we have announced. When a minority of the members meet to investigate
or discuss a public matter then it becomes a factual issue to determine in each case whether
the majority has fragmentized itself into minority groups merely to collaborate on a
decision in private for the purpose of thus secretly concluding the matter." Id. at
The Attorney General of Florida has stated, however, that an informal telephone conversation or an informal discussion between two or more school board members is not a
prosecutable offense "if there is no attempt to exclude any member of the public or press
seeking admission to the place of discussion." Where a quorum is present at an informal
meeting, however, "the obligation rests on the board members to discontinue meeting or
discussion of public business until reasonable notice . . . [is] given since such discussion
without such notice constitutes violation." Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. (Jan. 27, 1971).
EDITOR'S NoTE: Since the writing of this note the Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed
the holding of the First District Court of Appeal in Canney. Thus, exception of quasi-judicial
matters from the effect of the Sunshine Law is now firmly established. Canney v. Board of
Pub. Instr., Nos. 39,473 and 39,474 (Fla., Feb. 24, 1971).
38. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
39. Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
40. 32 Fla. Supp. 7, 9 (11th Cir. 1969).
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tions, actions, reports, etc. must be open and public, for these are as
much "official acts" as the final vote itself.
Thus, it seems that if a group's functions are deemed subject to the law, no
stage of its proceedings will be exempt.
Dicta in Times Publishing Co.41 revealed that the Second District Court
of Appeal expressly viewed quasi-judicial deliberations 42 as subject to the
provisions of the Sunshine Law. In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction,
however, the First District Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that quasijudicial actions do not "fall within the purview of the.., statute." 43 Canney
involved a decision by a school board relating to the discipline of a student.
Relying upon article V, section 3, of the Florida Constitution,4 4 the court
emphasized that it alone had the exclusive power to order the conduct and
procedure of the "internal government" of the judicial branch. 45 The opinion
then stated that the legislature can vest quasi-judicial functions in a county
6
school board, but:'
[once it has transformed any of the board's responsibilities and duties]
into that of a judicial character, its prerogatives in the matter have
ceased. Neither the public nor the press has any more right to enter into
the judicial deliberations of the members of a county board... than
they have to enter into the conference room of the Supreme Court of
Florida when the members of that Court are deliberating upon a
judicial question or into a petit jury room when those citizens are
deliberating upon their verdict.
Thus, the first exception on behalf of the government units has been
carved out. The controversy stemming from this decision concerns the propriety of equating quasi-judicial functions with actions of the state judicial
system. If such reasoning is proper, disciplinary matters, such as those in
Canney, and other quasi-judicial activities will no longer be subject to the
Sunshine Law; any session in which a decision affecting a private party is
deliberated might be excluded from the Act's coverage. If, however, the dicta
of Times Publishing Co. is adopted by the Florida supreme court, this exception would be eliminated. The split of opinion between the Second District
Court of Appeal in Times Publishing Go. and the First District in Canney
7
has forced the supreme court to hear the question.4
41. 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969).
42. Quasi-judicial is defined as "a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature." A quasi-judicial act is defined as "a judicial act performed
by one not a judge." BLAcK's LAW DicxnoNmRx 1411 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
43. 231 So. 2d 34, 39 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970).
44. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3: "Practice and procedure - The practice and procedure in
all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court."
45. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 231 So. 2d 34, 39 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
46.

Id.

47. The Florida Constitution grants "conflict jurisdiction" to the supreme court when
district courts of appeal are in conflict with each other. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4(2). Canney
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It is illogical to assume that no other exception to the Sunshine Law
will ever exist. However, even in cases where the law's application may result
in great harm, the non-exclusory nature of the law will probably cause
exceptions to be developed narrowly, depending on the circumstances of each
case. Nevertheless, the broadness of the statute, coupled with the recentness
of its enactment, makes judicial determination vital for the resolution of
problems involving the applicability of this law.
The Second District Court of Appeal in Times Publishing Co. dismissed
contentions that the Act has generally recognized exceptions and expressly
declared that personnel matters were subject to the law.48 The court asserted
there are "no exceptions . . . unless there is a constitutional impediment to
such a mandate.. . ."49 However, the 1968 Florida Constitution provides little

immunity. The only provisions that have yet been recognized as impediments
are article V (the judicial department), sections 3 and 23,- dealing respectively with procedure in the judicial system and discipline of attorneys.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida endorsed the Times Publishing
Co. interpretation "as being an accurate analysis of the subject statute." 5' 1
Significantly, the court in Times had acknowledged only one exception to
the Sunshine Law and stated that while the statute "has waived the attorneyclient privilege with regard to the enumerated public bodies," 52 there are
other facets of the privilege to be considered: 58
[T]here ... are obligations which bind the attorney ....
His professional conduct in [pending or impending litigation] ... is governed by
the Canons of Ethics ...

promulgated by the Supreme Court.... Sec-

tion 23 of Art. 5 ... gives "exclusive" jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
in the disciplining of attorneys; and this disciplinary power necessarily
includes the exclusive province to proscribe rules of professional conduct the breaching of which renders an attorney amenable to such
discipline ....
The legislature... is without any authority to directly or indirectly
interfere with or impair an attorney in the exercise of his ethical
duties ....
The court emphasized that the exception was restricted to "that area of
the attorney-client relationship in which the ethical obligations of the atv. Board of Pub. Instr. is now pending before the court.
48. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
49. Id. at 473.
50. FLA. CONSr. art. V, §23 provides: "Admission and discipline of attorneys - The
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law
and the disciplining of persons admitted. It may provide for an agency to handle admissions
subject to its supervision. It may also provide for the handling of discretionary matters in
the circuit courts and the district courts of appeal, or by commissions consisting of members
of the bar to be designated by it, the supreme court, subject to its supervision and review."
Art. V, §3 provides: "Practice and procedure - The practice and procedure in all courts
shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court."
51. Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
52. 222 So. 2d 470, 475 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
53. Id.
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torney clearly conflict with the dictates of this statute. . . . T]he act does
not permit private consultation between the agency and its attorney in any
other circumstances. . . ." 5Hence, a governmental unit may not exercise
the privilege, but an attorney may utilize it to safeguard his professional
standing.r5 While partial nonrecognition of the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality may be criticized, the Florida position is not so extreme as
others. Under a similar statute 56 the Arkansas courts have ruled that the
57
traditional lawyer's privilege is never valid.
Enforcement of the Sunshine Law
Standing to enforce the Sunshine Law has been granted by the provisions
of the statute to "any citizens of this state."58 Problems of standing are thus
virtually eliminated for Floridians. Enforcement may be accomplished by
injunctive relief, orders declaring past actions of meetings void, and criminal
penalties. 59 The Times Publishing Co. decision noted: "Injunctive relief is
an extraordinary remedy which issues only when justice requires and there
is not adequate remedy at law, and when there is real and imminent danger
or irreparable injury." 0 However, the opinion concluded that the statutory
provision for injunctive relief mandates that violation of the law "constitutes
an irreparable public injury."' Injunctions under the Sunshine Law are
more easily obtainable because "one of the requisites ... need not be proved,
i.e., an irreparable injury; and a mere showing that the statute has been or is
62
clearly about to be violated fully satisfies such requirement."
The Sunshine Law states: "[N]o resolution, rule, regulation or formal
63
action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting."
Thus, any action taken at or resulting from a meeting later declared in
violation of the law is void ab initio and may be ignored by persons subject
to such action. Invalidation of illegally enacted decisions is characteristic of
similar laws that were passed in other states almost simultaneously with the
Sunshine Law.6 4 States whose laws are older have not so quickly voided such
action automatically. 65 California courts have held that violation of the open

54. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968).
57. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
58. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969). This clause may present constitutional problems of
privileges and immunities. For example, the Sunshine Law would not necessarily secure

the right of a Georgia citizen who owns property in Florida to be present at zoning

commissions' meetings, et cetera.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
(Supp.

Id.
222 So. 2d 470, 476 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
Id.
Id. See also Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. (Jan. 27, 1971).
FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969).
See AxK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §§57-601 to -609 (1967).
See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§54950-60 (West 1966); N.J. Rxv. STAT. §§10:4-1 et seq.
1963).
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meeting statute does not necessarily nullify action.,, New Jersey courts,
however, have stated that although executive dosed sessions are allowed under
their statute, any formal action taken or resulting from an illegal meeting
not only can be, but ordinarily should be, voided, even if the action was
taken in good faith.3
Section three of the Sunshine Law provides for criminal penalties of fine
or imprisonment or both for violators.6 Nullification of action seems automatic upon proof of violation of the statute, but the Florida supreme court
has held that charge and proof of scienter is needed for the criminal conviction of officials. 69 Therefore, while an unintended violation will negate
action, it will not subject the members of an agency to criminal penalties.
Specific intent to ignore the Act is a prerequisite for the law's criminal penalties. This interpretation seems desirable since the inadvertent violator should
not suffer from the penal provision as long as the public remains protected.
COMMON EXCEPTIONS TO OPEN MEETING POLICIES

The Government in the Sunshine Law has been criticized as being too
broad and comprehensive. Unlike the other five states with similar statutes,
Florida's law contains no specific exceptions. Common exceptions in other
states are personnel matters,7- grand juries, 71 and confidential records. 72 The
Brown Act of California also exempts matters affecting national security and
examination of witnesses. 73 New Jersey's law contains an exception that
74
apparently exempts eminent domain proceedings.
Florida critics have concentrated their complaints upon two issues: eminent
domain and personnel matters. 75 Eminent domain proceedings have traditionally been conducted in dosed meetings. The critics contend that if it is
publicly known which lands will be condemned, the markets will be subject
to sales that adversely affect taxpayers, since speculators would buy land
proposed for public use, hampering efficient purchasing by public agencies.
66.
21 Cal.
67.
(1963).
68.
69.

Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Collins, 202 Cal. App. 2d 677, 682,
Rptr. 56, 59 (1962).
See Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 553, 192 A.2d 305, 809

§286.011 (1969).
Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969). See also Op. Arr'y
GEN. FLA. (Jan. 27, 1971) in which it is said that criminal prosecutions under the Sunshine
Law differ from civil injunctive suits in that the "former require charge and proof of
scienter." The opinion further states that one who initially votes against the use of a secret
ballot nonetheless violates the law if he continues in attendance and participates in secret
balloting. Id.
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE §54957 (West 1966).
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §5-6-17 (1953).
72. IND. ANN. STAT. §57-605 (1967); N.J. Rav. STAT. §10:4-4 (Supp. 1963).
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE §54957 (West 1966).
74. N.J. Rv. STAT. §10:4-4 (Supp. 1963).
75. Interviews, note 2 supra. The Attorney General of Florida has taken the position
that the supreme court's opinion in Berns "indicates condemnation matters, personnel
FLA. STAT.

matters, pending litigation and other privileged matters [are] . . . not excepted .
specifically so enacted by Legislature." Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. (Jan. 29, 1971).
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On the other hand, it can be argued that abuse existed in the past because
of the channeling of inside information to friends and relatives of those
participating in condemnation proceedings. In light of this context, closed
meetings for eminent domain proceedings do not seem imperative.
Several states explicitly recognize the traditional need for confidentiality
in the area of personnel matters in their open meeting laws.76 In hiring
practices, however, there is little reason to consider applicants' qualifications
in dosed sessions, since the public has a right to know if its prospective
employees are qualified for positions to which they aspire. Should a person's
background reflect unfavorably upon his competence for the position sought,
he may look elsewhere for employment. Generally, the same openness is also
warranted in the actual dismissal of public employees.
It is in the area of disciplinary matters that Government in the Sunshine
is most validly subject to criticism. In opening all personnel considerations
to public observation, "innocent... personnel may be ruined for life or their
character assassinated if hearings . . . relating to charges of misconduct are
77
aired publicly and prove to be ill-founded."
California's position on personnel disciplinary matters seems most tenable.
Unlike other states, which make such matters unequivocally confidential,
California law requires that hearings on complaints or charges brought against
public employees be confidential unless the person so charged requests they
be public. Upon such request the session will be opened.78 Such a law provides adequate safeguards against unnecessary humiliation or maligning statements, but grants basic rights of fair, open trial to those who desire to exercise
them. Florida should consider amending its statute to include such a provision.
CRITICISM

OF FLORIDA'S

SUNSHINE

LAw

A comparison with other open meeting laws reveals noticeable omissions
and defects in the Sunshine Law. The Florida statute applies to "any board
or commission or any state agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation or any political subdivision. . ... ,79 The words are sweeping in
effect, but are not as definitive as they could or should be. Definitional precision in the laws of other states has greatly aided courts in determining which
agencies, commissions, and governmental units are affected by their respective
laws.
For example, California's Brown Act80 defines legislative bodies affected
as "the governing board, commission, directors or body of a local agency or
any board or commission thereof... on which officers of a local agency, serve
76. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); CAL. Gov'T CODE §54957 (West 1966). Cf.
Op. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. (Jan. 29, 1971), which states that a school board may not negotiate
directly or indirectly with public employees in secret, noting that a bill to exempt collective
bargaining from the Sunshine Law failed of passage in 1970.
77. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
78. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §54957 (West 1966). See also Cozzolino v City of Fontana, 136
Cal. App. 2d 608, 289 P.2d 248 (1955).
79. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1969).
80. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§54950-60 (West 1966).
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in their official capacity as members and which is supported in whole or in
part by funds provided for such agency... ."I" "Legislative body" also includes
"permanent boards or commissions of a local agency." 82 The California83
judiciary has used the definition to apply the law to urban renewal agencies
and zoning commissions84 since they are supported wholly or partially by
public funds. The California statute even applies to such governmental
activities when operated or organized by a private corporation s 5
The "Right to Know Law" of New Jersey is applicable to any "group of
2 or more persons organized ... to perform a public governmental function
by official action." 86 Official action is defined by statute as a determination
by vote.87 Utilizing this definition, the New Jersey courts have applied the
law to zoning commissions."5
New Mexico's statute affects "all . . . governmental boards and commis-89 The
sions of the state or its subdivisions, supported by public funds....
New Mexico judiciary has even applied this statute to a city-owned electrical
company on the basis that it was supported by public funds.90
The Arkansas Act delineates its intended scope by stating that the law
encompasses "all ... of the governing bodies of all municipalities, counties,
townships, and school districts, and all boards, bureaus, commissions, or
organizations of the State of Arkansas, except Grand Juries, supported wholly
" While
or in part by public funds, or expending public funds . . . ..
Arkansas courts have not been confronted with an "applicable body" question,
the statute provides guidelines for use in determining each case. Presumably,
the courts of Arkansas will apply their statute much as the courts of New
Mexico have applied theirs.
Definitional words in the cited statutes have thus been utilized as guides
for judicial interpretation and courts have applied the laws to groups such
as urban renewal agencies, 92 zoning commissions, 93 and city-owned electrical
companies. 94 The courts of other states may also be aided by the specific
references and examples generally contained in the statutes. California, for
example, specifically included library boards and recreation commissions. 95
The Florida Sunshine Law lacks this precision; yet, by its breadth, it would
81.

Id. §54952.

82. Id. §54952.5
83. Old Town Dev. Corp. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 249 Cal. App. 2d 313, 57 Cal. Rptr.
426 (1967).
84. Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960).
85. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §54952 (-West 1966).
86. N.J. REv. STAT. §10.4-2 (Supp. 1963).
87. Id.
88. Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 454, 194 A.2d 26 (1963).
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. §5-6-17 (1953) (emphasis added).
90. Raton Publishing Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 417 P.2d 32 (1966).
91. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968).
92. Old Town Dev. Corp. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 249 Cal. App. 2d 313, 57 Cal. Rptr.
426 (1967).
93. Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 454, 194 A.2d 26 (1963).
94. Raton Publishing Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 417 P.2d 32 (1966).
95. CAL. Gov'T CODE §54952.5 (West 1966).
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certainly seem to affect any of the above-mentioned agencies. Determining
the groups, if any, to which the law does not apply, however, is another
matter. It is noteworthy that Arkansas, the only other state whose courts have
not adjudicated the question of applicability, also passed its law in 1967. The
New Mexico and California laws were enacted in 1953, and the New Jersey
statute was passed in 1963. If the experiences of other states are indicative, it
seems likely that the question will arise in the Florida courts. A clarification
of the bodies affected by the law would probably make the law more practicable; it could eliminate ad hoc compliance and reduce unreasonable or
unintended applications.
A second flaw in the statute is its lack of a uniform minimum notice
provision. Agencies and commissions may still have individual notice regulations with which citizens may be unfamiliar. An unannounced or unattended
public meeting is of little use to those interested in the deliberations of a
public agency. Once again, provisions in other statutes exemplify how
Government in the Sunshine could be utilized more effectively by the ordinary citizen. Exceptions to any uniform notice provision would undoubtedly
be necessary; however, individualized notice provisions should be the exception rather than the rule.
One statute making certain city governments subject to open meetings
provides that regular meetings shall be held in a place "designated by ordinance" and special meetings may be called at any time "by written notice
delivered at least three hours prior to the time specified for the proposed
meeting."' ' 6 The Arkansas statute insists that the "time and place of each
regular meeting shall be furnished to anyone who requests the information.
...
In the event of emergency or special meetings the person calling such a
meeting shall notify the representatives of the [media], if any, located in the
county in which the meeting is to be held and which have requested to be
notified... of the time, place and date at least two (2) hours before such a
meeting takes place. . . .
This statute is probably the best practical model
for any amendment to Florida's statute.
A third and final omission in the Sunshine Law is its lack of reference to
reporting privileges. The press and other communication media greatly
stimulated the passage of the Sunshine Law98 and maintain an active interest
in its enforcement. The law is mute in relation to broadcasting privileges,
however.
The Hughes Anti-Secrecy Act of Indiana, 99 which is similar to the Government in the Sunshine Law, explicitly allows recorded or live broadcasting
subject to reasonable rules and regulations. The media may be required,
however, to pool recording or broadcasting facilities."1 0 In their notice provisions Arkansas and California recognize the interest of the media in public
meetings.',"
"1

96. Ky. RLv. STAT. §88.040 (Supp. 1968).
97. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968).
98. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
99. IND. ANN. STAT. §§57-601 to -609 (1967).
100. Id. §§57-608 to -609.
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-2805 (1968); CAL. Gov'T CODE §54956 (West 1966).
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Problems have arisen in other states concerning the broadcasting privilege.
A New York municipality, which had open meetings, was permitted, for
example, to disallow the taping of an open session by a private party, because
official minutes were taken at the meeting.1 0 2 The California standards are
more practicable. California's attorney general has ruled it is within the
discretion of a county board of supervisors to refuse to permit a radio station
to broadcast its regular meetings. 0 3 The California courts, however, have
ruled that "where a recorder is silent and unobtrusive and . . . does not

interfere in any way with the meetings" taping should be allowed.04 The
California view seems reasonable, while the New York decision, by comparison,
seems unduly restrictive. So long as the rights of others are respected by the
media, there appears no reason to bar taping of public meetings.
THE SUNSHINE LAw IN PERSPECTIVE

Government in the Sunshine assures the right of the public to be present
at all important meetings of governmental units that affect them. That right
to be present is unqualified except in certain unusual instances. The law of
Indiana explicitly states the essential thrust of open meeting laws: "[P]ublic
proceedings shall be open to any citizen of this state, and every citizen shall,
insofar as physical facilities permit, be permitted to observe such proceeding."105 As illustrated by the parties to the cases on the subject, the news media
are apparently the most interested in exercising this right to attend. Three of
the first four cases in Florida involve attempts by newspapermen to be present
at "executive sessions" or dosed meetings of public bodies.0 Press utilization
of open meeting provisions may also be observed in other states, such as
California 07 and Indiana. 0 8 Television, like the newspapers, takes an active
interest in Government in the Sunshine and keeps the subject before its
audiences.'D 9
This is not to imply, however, that the Sunshine Law and similar statutes
were enacted only for the convenience of the communications media. Cases
arising from public meeting laws include private suits challenging zoning
decisions,"10 racial apportionment of schools,", disciplinary actions by school
boards,11 2 decisions of city electrical companies,"13 and dismissal of public
102.

Davidson v. Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 385 (1963).

103.

[1960-1962] CAL. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 52.

104. Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 778, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50, 52 (1965).
105.

IND. ANN. STAT. §57-604 (1967).

106. Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971). Board of Pub. Instr. v.
Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
107. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
108. Indiana is the only state that gives broadcasting special attention in its statute.
See IND. ANN. STAT. §§57-601 to -609 (1967).

109.
110.
111.
112.

See, e.g., Editorial, WJXT-TV, Jacksonville, Florida, April 21, 1970.
Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 192 A.2d 305 (1963).
Schults v. Board of Educ., 86 N.J. Super. 29, 205 A.2d 762 (1964).
Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 231 So. 2d 34 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970).

113.

Raton Publishing Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 417 P.2d 32 (1966).
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personnel. 1114 Open meeting laws afford interested citizens a chance to attend
informal sessions to see what is decided and how the decision is reached.
CONCLUSION

Despite its unnecessarily vague portions, the Government in the Sunshine
Law is a step toward more open and responsible government. Definitional
phrases are needed to assure a better practical application and for added
clarity. The past refusal to exempt personnel matters, especially in disciplinary
investigations, reports, and hearings, is unjust to those unfairly accused and
should be reexamined. Additionally, the law's application to certain ad hoc
and advisory groups should be reevaluated. Finally, the lack of a uniform
notice provision undermines the effect of the law by making compliance with
Government in the Sunshine depend in some instances upon non-existent
means of informing the public of prospective meetings.
In spite of its unpolished draftsmanship, the problems presented by the
Sunshine Law are easily outweighed by its potential utility. The valuable
opportunity to observe and participate in government decisions is undeniably
secured by the Sunshine Law. Greater precision, however, would encourage
a more meaningful participation by the general public.
RUTH MAYES BARNES

114.

Cozzolino v. City of Fontana, 136 Cal. App. 2d 608, 289 P.2d 248 (1955).
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